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Since the birth of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1948–49, the allies
have struggled to find a common policy and strategy amid episodes of
dispute about the ends and means of their common effort.1 This process
represents a leading feature of the alliance and perhaps a chief cause for its
durability across five decades. However, the succession of crises beneath
NATO’s blue and white flag fed skepticism among numerous critics. In the
minds of such doubters,2 the alliance suffered from flaws of lopsided, U.S.-
centric decision making, an uneven division of labor that gave European
members a “free ride,” and, most of all, a nuclear strategy that in the
unthinkable event would cause a “Euroshima.” Briefly in 1989–91, all such
skepticism seemed to dissolve thanks to the bloodless demise of the Cold
War. This false dawn of peace, however, gave way to a new day of violence
1 For instance, Lawrence S. Kaplan, The Long Entanglement: NATO’s First Fifty Years (Westport, Conn.:
Praeger, 1999).
2 Of many examples, see Melvyn Krauss, How NATO Weakens The West (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986).
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Kraemer, U.S. Army; LTC (Ret) Richard Hoffman, U.S. Army and LTC (Ret) John Feeley, U.S. Army for their wise
advice in connection with this essay.
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in Europe as well as to the renaissance of collective security in which NATO
has played a decisive part, despite its past as an organization of collective
defense.3 The 1990s brought fresh evidence of divergent conceptions of
policy and strategy and a new struggle for consensus as NATO shifted its
focus from collective defense to the imperatives of collective security and
even the waging of war in the former Yugoslavia.
The books under review here focus chiefly on the most well known
episode of NATO’s adaptation to the imponderables of the strategic present:
the 1999 campaign from the sky against the Slobodan Milosevic regime.
However, the story of force and statecraft in Kosovo in 1998–99 makes no
sense without an analysis embedded within more generalized issues of
war and peace as well as the dominant continuities in the essence of
NATO itself. In particular, the books recall how leaders of democracies
and democratic alliances make policy and strategy, issues of U.S. com-
mitment to European security, the nature of strategic theory as visible in
Clausewitz, and the character of military professionalism in the United
States, all in the changing face of war, particularly since 1989 in limited
war. Clark, Galen Carpenter, and Duignan, each in their own way, address
these overarching problems of force and statecraft. The constants of policy
and strategy in the Atlantic sphere emerged decades before 1989 and have
remained present in modified form as NATO’s focus shifted from the
imperatives of collective defense within the red-blue confines of the Cold
War to the more gray regions of collective security in a Europe devoid of
perpetual peace.
By spring 1999, the policy and strategy makers in the Euro-Atlantic
sphere had to relearn two fundamental insights from Clausewitz’s theory
about the nature of war: (1) that war in the abstract and war in reality are
two different things, and (2) that war is a “true chameleon” that is
constantly changing its outward shape and appearance.4 The sorties of the
first allied aircraft on March 24 and thereafter against a handful of targets
brought no swift capitulation, disappointing those who hoped for a repeat
of the diplomatic and strategic effects of the limited air strikes against
Republika Srbksa circa 1994–95. Rather, once the first NATO projectiles
fell in late March, the Serbs, in keeping with the Yugoslav doctrine of
territorial defense “to all azimuths,” both hunkered down in Belgrade
and lashed out with greater fury at the Kosovars around Pristina and
beyond.
In this connection, the U.S. advocates of air power theory and a
3 David Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Institute of Peace, 1998).
4 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard et al., eds. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp.
78 ff. In addition to Clark, the present account of the Kosovo war relies on Ivo Daalder et al., Winning Ugly:
NATO’s War to Save Kosovo (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2000).
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strategy of annihilation5 have asserted that the manner in which the NATO
powers waged war in March–June 1999 was disfigured by an excess of
“political control.” They decry the manner in which Secretary of State Made-
leine Albright assumed the role as chief of the war party in the U.S. cabinet.
In this view, undue timidity in the civil-military selection of such air targets as
Belgrade’s television stations, the highway, and Danube bridges had ham-
strung the sorties of the NATO allied tactical aircraft, needlessly softened the
blow to the Milosevic regime, and thus prolonged the war. According to such
shibboleths of annihilation, this combination of “civilian interference” in U.S.
strategy and operations, as well as in the North Atlantic Council (NAC),
unduly constrained the ability of military professionals to fight according to
their doctrines of operations and tactics.6 In this way, NATO and U.S. policy
and strategy repeated the “errors” made in the Vietnam War in 1964–65.
All the tension over strategy, operations, and tactics of annihilation or
attrition seemed to concentrate itself in April 1999 around the person of the
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), Wesley Clark. One should
consider the inherent strengths and weaknesses of the office of SACEUR—the
senior operational commander of NATO’s Allied Command Europe (ACE),
which is simultaneously that of Commander in Chief (CINC) of the U.S.
theater command for Europe and most of Africa.7 Despite his grand official
residence and the huge desk and flags that surround SACEUR at his work-
place in Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), his com-
mand post stands on low ground, denuded of cover.8 Hence, this most
prominent of U.S. commands is especially vulnerable to policy and strategy
shifts, both national and multinational, which have previously tossed U.S.
theater commanders from their posts in times of crisis and war.
So as NATO bombs fell after dusk on the air defenses and strategic
targets of Belgrade, Novi Sad, and Podgorica, by dawn’s light the bully boys
of Serbian ethnic purity wielded their cudgels and fired their antiaircraft guns
against the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo. The NATO aircrews flew their
machines safely out of range of Serb anti-aircraft fire, but they had seemingly
sped beyond the sphere of strategic efficacy as well.
The reader of General Clark’s memoirs learns that SACEUR responded
to this incipient disaster for the Western alliance with a draft plan to escalate
5 Gordon Craig et al., Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time, 3d ed. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1995), pp. 258–74; on the strategy of annihilation versus attrition, cf. Hans Delbrueck, Die
Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1962) Vol. IV, pp. 333 ff.
6 Gian P. Gentile, How Effective is Strategic Bombing? Lessons Learned for World War II to Kosovo (New York:
New York University Press, 2001), pp. 10–32, 191–94.
7 Thomas Durell Young, ed. Command in NATO after the Cold War: Alliance, National and Multi-national
Considerations (Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 1997).
8 Robert S. Jordan, ed. Generals in International Politics: NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1988); Jordan, The NATO International Staff/Secretariat, 1952–1957
(London: Oxford University Press, 1967); and Jordan, Political Leadership in NATO: A Study in Multinational
Diplomacy (Boulder: Westview, 1979).
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the war. Clark’s scenario against the Serbian center of gravity in Kosovo
unfolded before him in the remove of his headquarters in Casteau, Belgium,
where it must have first glimmered on PowerPoint slide screens in the CINC’s
conference room. This strategic/operational idea was based, in part, on his
previous experiences in the tactical and operational echelons of the U.S.
Army doctrine and training establishment. These PowerPoint slides cast a
beam 60 kilometers up the road from Casteau into the main wing of NATO
Headquarters at Brussels/Evere, where men and women of the NAC debated
across the table. Simultaneously, just down the hall from the Council meeting,
this light flashed before Dr. Jamie Shea, the head of the NATO office of
information and press, as he tried to banish the specter of stalemate and
defeat that hung over the briefing auditorium amid the mixture of jet exhaust,
exploding ordnance, and television images.
Such smoke and fire failed to obscure SACEUR’s vision. He glimpsed
the way forward to victory via a decisive NATO air-land campaign in two
dimensions against the Serbian center of gravity in Kosovo. In short, deep
strike forces must hit home at the Serb military and paramilitary units that
were tormenting the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Clark’s
conceptions called for batteries of surface-to-surface high-
tech rocket artillery firing their barrages at the Serbian forces
across mountains from Albania into Kosovo, driving them out
of their cover, where they would then fall easy prey to the
flying armor of the U.S. Army and subsequent echelons of
heavy, mechanized ground troops.
Fate dealt otherwise with this PowerPoint air-land
battle, as it did with so much else in this unhappy story. The
high command in Washington, D.C. (that is, the combination
of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the staff
of the U.S. Army) balked at the idea: it departed from the U.S. military strategy
and dogma of two simultaneous wars being waged in the Persian Gulf and on
the Korean Peninsula. The deployment of U.S. Army forces from Germany to
Albania took longer than expected. The tactical training of the task force in
Albania demanded yet more time. Most important, the nineteen North Atlan-
tic allies could never finally agree on this step, which would symbolize a vast
escalation of the war via the dispatch of ground forces—all talk about
echelons of deep strike and “full spectrum dominance” notwithstanding. In
the event, the rocket batteries stood silent, the armored helicopters never
took up the hunt across the mountain passes, and the armored and mecha-
nized infantry remained in their assembly areas in Albania and Macedonia.
They only marched into Kosovo weeks later, once the knotted effects of
NATO force and statecraft in combination with the UN/EU/U.S. Contact
Group (i.e., Russian diplomacy in league with the West) compelled Milosevic
to capitulate to the nineteen allies.









are awestruck at how contentious the making of policy was in March–June
1999 and how close NATO apparently came to failure in the first weeks of the
war. However, this may be beside the point.9 In the first instance, one might
generalize that ever since the middle of the nineteenth century, when de-
mocracies have waged war they have generally started out rather haltingly
amid great setbacks, and then done better as they went along.10 Such was
plainly the case after December 1941, June 1950 and even after August 1990.
In the second instance, there is nothing especially remarkable about feuds
and strife among generals, civilian defense officials and ministers of defense.
The tasks of command, even in peacetime, require a bold will to accomplish
them, and inevitable clashes with others with golden shoulder boards, stars
and crossed batons or in blue serge suits.
In the case of the SACEUR in the years 1998–99, the reader becomes
aware of an old truth that reaches back to the foundation of NATO and to the
war in Korea, namely, that leading figures in the high command of the U.S.
armed forces have had significant doubts about U.S. policy and strategy in
Europe; further, there has long existed a school of thought in the U.S. Army
and elsewhere in the Department of Defense that assigns greater strategic
importance to geographical areas other than Europe.11
However, the chief issue in Clark’s book is the dilemma of how a U.S.
theater commander balances the dictates of national strategy with those of
multinational and alliance strategy in crisis and limited war.12 In this regard,
the fate of Wesley Clark recalls that of one very well known general, Douglas
MacArthur,13 and another less well-remembered general, Lauris Norstad.14
Each of these theater commanders in earlier instances of coalition war faced
circumstances that might be said to resemble those connected with Clark’s
war and his discomfiture. All of this was also somewhat less prominent in the
now reified case of the 1990–91 Gulf War, the memory of which has revived
the dogma of the battle of annihilation for strategists and tacticians of all
9 Too many contemporary observers of these processes assume a kind of ideal form of civil-military
interaction and harmonious roles for the political leader as strategist and for the field commander at the cusp of
strategy and operations. Such is unsubstantiated by the record of war and policy in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. Cf. Dominick Graham and Shelford Bidwell, Coalitions, Politicians, & Generals: Some Aspects of
Command in Two World Wars (London/New York: Brassey’s, 1993); Gordon A. Craig, Krieg, Politik, und
Diplomatie (Vienna: Zsolnay, 2001); Adolf Heusinger, Befehl im Widerstreit: Schicksalstunden der deutschen
Armee, 1923–1945 (Tuebingen: Hase/Koelher, 1950).
10 Michael Howard, War in European History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976); Russell Weigley, The
American Way of War: A History of U.S. Military Strategy and Policy (New York: MacMillan, 1973).
11 Richard Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crises (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), pp.
81–83; Phil Williams, The Senate and U.S. Troops in Europe (New York: St. Martin’s, 1985); Simon Duke, United
States Military Forces and Installations in Europe (London: Oxford University Press, 1989).
12 Limited war in the sense of Clausewitz, but also in that of the U.S. experience since 1945.
13 D. Clayton James et al., Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis in Korea, 1950–1953 (New York:
Free Press, 1993); Callum A. MacDonald, Britain and the Korean War (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).




stripes.15 At the start of the decade, apparently, the dynamics of coalitional
decision-making at the nexus of the strategic and operational levels of war for
U.S. Central Command posed fewer conundrums than for SHAPE and U.S.
European Command in Kosovo. However, a comparison of these two cases,
although it is implicit in Clark’s analysis, lies outside the scope of this essay.
The issue of greatest import rests in the set of underlying ideas about policy
and strategy, which the theater commander brought to bear in the face of
policy and strategy in a limited war waged by a coalition.
Clark’s idea of “modern war” is “limited, carefully constrained in
geography and scope, weaponry and effects. . .” (p. xxiv). This phenomenon
is counterpoised to its notional opposite, visible in U.S. military doctrine of
the decisive battle, the sources of which, are found in the era of revolutionary
and Napoleonic warfare. Clark’s first chapter contains an account of how the
author learned at the U.S. Military Academy in the early 1960s the answer to
the first question in Clausewitz’s On War, “What is War?”16 That is, Clark
acquired, like thousands of other company-grade officers in the U.S. Army of
his era and since, the fundamental U.S. strategic, operational and tactical
doctrine. He and his peers embraced the emphasis on the decisive battles
waged by large echelons in the manner attributed to Napoleon by his
successors. This code is summed up in the dogma of Douglas MacArthur,
namely that “there is no substitute for victory” (p. xxii), which since the end
of the Indochina war in 1975 has been reinterpreted by succeeding genera-
tions and embodied in the Weinberger–Powell doctrine.
Not by accident does Clark open with a reference to Douglas
MacArthur’s order of 1943 to a subordinate commander to seize his objective
in New Guinea or perish in the process. In the same page (p. xxi), the former
SACEUR describes the grim moment on March 31, 1999, when then NATO
Secretary General Javier Solana gave the SACEUR guidance on the political-
military process of decision making for the selection of air targets in Serbia.
Here Clark makes the odd blooper (which so many reviewers strangely
accept uncritically) to the effect that “above me everything was political or
political military. Below me was just the military. I was at the waist of the
hourglass. . .” (p. xxi).
Elsewhere in his account of the diplomacy and strategy that led to the
1995 Dayton Accords and, finally, to the luckless 1998 negotiations at Ram-
bouillet, Clark well understands the civil and military character of the strategic
friction that accumulated before and during the Kosovo war (pp. 29 ff). This
process concerns the forward policy in Southeastern Europe advanced by the
15 Jehuda Wallach, The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1986).
16 Clark learned the answer of Clausewitz’s rival, Henri de Jomini. The Prussian has only been en vogue since
1976 and, more often than not, he remains a subject of total misunderstanding among soldiers and civilians alike.
Cf. John Shy, “Jomini,” in Peter Paret et al., eds., Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986) pp. 143–185.
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National Security Council and the U.S. State Department and the resistance to
such policy that concentrated itself in the U.S. Department of Defense. Here
Clark witnessed a frustrating and bloody experience in the sorry years of the
middle and late chapters of the war of Yugoslav succession in which the
United States became ever more involved amid an arduous process of
hesitation and later action in the leading allied capitals. There is really little
about which the West can boast here in the years 1991–1995, save that it
finally acted, albeit too late for those in their multitude who presently fell
victim to war.
This phenomenon of resistance in DOD to an interventionist policy in
Southeastern Europe in the early years of the descent of the U.S. into the
travail of former Yugoslavia marched under the banner of the Weinberger–
Powell doctrine. This phase brought forth ludicrous assertions as to how
Tito’s partisans circa 1941–43 had defeated dozens of Axis divisions and
would dole out the same fate to NATO troops. General Clark saw in fright-
ening detail the long slide into war in Bosnia and Kosovo on the twisted road
to the besieged Sarajevo circa 1994–95 as he aided Ambassador Richard
Holbrooke’s negotiations that led to the Dayton peace accords and to the
dispatch of the NATO Implementation Force to Bosnia in December 1995
(pp. 46–74). But the peace deal for Bosnia laid the seeds of renewed crisis in
Kosovo in the interval thereafter until 1998. The Rambouillet negotiations of
that year only accelerated the process of collapse and formed the prelude to
the NATO assault of March 24, 1999.
Wrestling with the evolution of NATO strategy since the early 1960s,
Clark takes exception with NATO’s Flexible Response17 strategy, character-
izing it as a burdensome relic of the 1960s with a crippling impact on
successor generations of strategists, guilty of the same “gradualism” of U.S.
strategy in Indochina in the “Operation Rolling Thunder” period of 1964–65
(pp. xix–xxxi, 3–28, 417–61). While a student of the early 1970s at the U.S.
Army’s Command and General Staff School, Clark had written a study on the
Vietnam strategy of Lyndon Johnson, Robert MacNamara and McGeorge
Bundy, who wrongly believed that calibrated bombing would persuade the
North Vietnamese to negotiate in the summer of 1964. Such limitations of
policy and strategy, Clark argues, instead signaled to the Vietnamese that the
United States sought some modest substitute for victory.
The hypothesis of Clark’s Fort Leavenworth master’s thesis in military
art, written as he began his rapid rise in a brilliant military career, suggested
that American forces must wield rapid hammer blows against vital enemy
centers of gravity in order to break the opponent’s will (p. 6). This idea
17 Jane Stromseth, The Origins of Flexible Response: NATO’s Debate Over Strategy in the 1960s (New York: St
Martin’s, 1988); Ivo Daalder, The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response: NATO Strategy and Theater Nuclear
Forces Since 1967 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).
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accords with that of Col. Harry Summer’s 1982 work, On Strategy,18 which
analyzed the sources of American defeat in Indochina. He asserted that a
strategic/operational way out of the strategic impasse loomed circa 1964–65
in the face of communist successes in South Vietnam; however, makers of
U.S. policy failed to grasp this opportunity, with the tragic results of a strategy
of attrition and eventual collapse.19 In this way, Clark echoes many other
soldiers of the past and present when he writes that in “modern democracies”
the political leaders are “too hesitant” in the decision to wage war in its initial
phase and hence apply too many constraints on military action; while military
leaders are “too timid” to insist upon the knockout blow and to achieve
“significant military objectives.” The result, in Clark’s mind, has been “ex-
tended campaigns that could leave democratic governments vulnerable to
their public opinion” (p. 6). Here he echoes a familiar refrain of professional
soldiers as they regard the civil-military requirements by which military
institutions and modern strategists must secure a basis in policy and society
amid the knotted effects of pluralism, mass politics, and the technological
refinement of weapons.20
Clark writes further in this vein about the impact of instantaneous and
omnipresent communications and the degree to which they now pose an
almost insurmountable problem for those who must master friction and
secure victory on the battlefield (p. 8 ff.).21 Media exposure only makes a
fetish of “zero defects” dogma and can paralyze military professionals. Thus
the inadvertent casualties among civilians, ranging from the twenty killed
when missiles struck a train on a bridge at Grdelicka Klisura to the accidental
bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, consume pages of Clark’s
memoir and put to rest once and for all any idea that technology has
somehow made war subject to perfect human control. On the contrary, in
Clark’s view, the perfectionist fetish, combined with pervasive media cover-
age, only blur the distinction between the sphere of the soldier and the
sphere of the civilian in modern warfare.
The crux of the issue, however, resides in the manner in which
democratic statecraft and civil-military checks and balances impact on the
span of control of the commander and in the making of strategy. In Clark’s
conception of modern war, all strategic effort must move more rapidly and
achieve more decisive political and strategic results while operating on the
18 Harry Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1982).
19 Ibid., pp. 1–7, 181–206; cf. critique in Andrew Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1986). pp. 258ff.
20 Donald Cameron Watt, Too Serious a Business: European Armed Forces and the Approach to the Second
World War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); Michael Geyer, “German Strategy in the Age of
Machine Warfare,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, pp. 527–597.




surreal ground zero of the rapidly blinking public eye (pp. 417 ff.). Here the
former SACEUR stands on less firm ground. He has found no firmer ground
by his conclusion, where he celebrates the timeless verity of the so-called
Principles of War—clear objective, unity of command, simplicity, massive
forces, etc. (p. 423).22 Thus he returns to what he learned as a cadet in the
battlements above the Hudson River in 1962 and relearned as a field grade
officer in 1973 while writing his master’s thesis at the fort on the plains.
By his embrace of what seems to this reviewer to be such a pessi-
mistic stance about the efficacy of strategy in a democracy, Clark associates
himself with a school of military thought and civil-military relations of prob-
lematic origin and perhaps even more questionable spirit. In the first instance,
one should say something about the gallery of ancestors in the U.S. military
experience who have shared this pessimism. Clark stands in the shadow of
the first professional U.S. officer-theorist, Emory Upton.23 Though essentially
unknown among today’s company and field-grade officers, his influence
pervades their universe of ideas. Upton’s suspicion of pluralistic politics
thrusts into the reader like a dagger from the pages of his history of U.S.
military policy,24 written prior to his untimely death in 1881
and only published in 1904. This work is the great-grand-
daddy of all writings by U.S. soldiers about what General
Clark would have his readers believe to be civilian govern-
ments and “modern war.” Nonetheless, Upton’s dismissal of
the civil-military potential of U.S. political institutions proved
ill founded in its day and has essentially remained so ever
since. Clark seems to take more than a page from Upton’s
book.
While Clark should surely be unhappy at how Secre-
tary of Defense William Cohen sent him into early retirement in 2000 after his
extraordinary and difficult service in former Yugoslavia, the issue here is less
the strategic limitations of democratic government than the nervous floun-
dering of civil and military elites as they face strategic realities in all their
political complexity and disorder, weighted down by an array of historical
analogues and ideological assumptions.
In the end, Clark shared the fate of the now forgotten SACEUR of
1956–62, Lauris Norstad.25 Both men ran afoul of the U.S. Secretary of
Defense in the midst of crisis because (a) they became perhaps too attuned
to the demands of their office in its multinational dimension, growing too
close to the realities and requirements of their theater of operations; (b) their
22 Cf. the critique of the “principles of war” in John Alger, The Quest for Victory: The History of the Principles
of War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1982).
23 Russell Weigley, Towards an American Army: Military Thought from Washington to Marshall (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1962) pp. 100–126.










conceptions of strategy in its practical and operational form applied to the
crisis of the moment (Berlin in 1961 and Kosovo in 1999) diverged from
strategic ideas dominant in the Pentagon and elsewhere in the U.S. govern-
ment; and (c) personalities of ambition and convictions as SACEUR suc-
cumbed to the changing power relations of the North Atlantic arena in crisis.
Norstad and Clark both tripped on difficulties with the political and
strategic logic of Flexible Response in the zone of tension between national
and multinational policies. The essential civil-military cause is unmistakably
linked across the gulf of time. Norstad wanted to retain the efficacy of the
Eisenhower administration’s strategy of Massive Retaliation by means of
nuclear sharing in NATO, so as to uphold the promise of extended deter-
rence, a position to which the Kennedy/McNamara team could not assent
because of fear of French and German unilateralism with the bomb.
Clark wrongly blames gradualism and Flexible Response for all ills in
contemporary strategy and, in particular, for the fate that befell him. One
should resist such a generalization. NATO’s Flexible Response, despite its
flaws of logic and its wretchedness in the minds of air power and annihila-
tionist strategists, did its job in the Cold War. Perhaps this success in the era
1967–89 derived from its never having been tested in combat, but the very
vagueness and elasticity of its principles allowed the alliance to “agree to
disagree” over issues that might otherwise have shattered the alliance many
times over. Rather, much of the effort of NATO’s senior civil and military
mechanisms since 1951 has constituted an attempt to bring some measure of
political and strategic logic and operational restraint to the imponderables of
escalation, terror, and alliance cohesion. The civil-military machinery of the
alliance had long been organized around the problems of nuclear deterrence
and the crisis management of limited Soviet incursions on the periphery of
the Article IV area that would impel only a measured rejoinder; that is, how
NATO could wield a politically sensible counterstroke to a move of less than
all-out war and thereby avoid the doomsday mechanism of the nuclear Single
Integrated Operational Plan. The 1999 war proceeded from this NATO cus-
tom, since the civil and military reform of the past decade has decidedly been
one of evolutionary steps, not an act of radical renovation that has junked all
that previously existed.
What is more, despite criticism of half measures and misdeeds in
leading NATO capitals and in the NAC, the Serbs blundered far more than the
West in their wars of the 1990s. Of paramount strategic importance for the
West must have been the sight of all the little Kosovar children in carts, put
to flight by Serbian thugs that recalled the Nazi SS. Such images were far more
strategically and operationally crucial to the war in Kosovo than most of the
day-by-day events in Clark’s war diary. Furthermore, the stumbling response
of gradual air strikes, which Clark and others interpret so critically, nonethe-
less did escalate the war and propel diplomacy that roughly achieved its
objectives. To be sure, this success derived from a combination of force and
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statecraft and not merely from combat alone. That is, the alliance did respond
to the violence and threat to values and interests circa 1998–99, and at a more
or less commensurate level of combat, thanks to NATO’s enduring strategic
culture. It may, therefore, subsume more wisdom than frustrated generals are
prepared to admit.
While the center of gravity of Clark’s memoirs is the interaction of
policy, strategy and operational doctrine, in NATO’s Empty Victory Galen
Carpenter and his collaborators place greatest weight on the interplay of
policy and diplomacy in the political systems among and within states.26
Accordingly, they take a dissenting view on nearly every aspect of policy in
the Kosovo war. They ask whether the conflict could have been averted and
answer yes: that a less ham-fisted diplomacy by the West would surely have
avoided war (pp. 11–50). They ask whether at least the consequences of the
conflict were successful and answer no: nearly all the effects were baleful
(pp. 51–122). They speculate about the way forward in Southeastern Europe
and Europe as a whole with analyses and prescriptions for action that diverge
sharply with U.S. and NATO statecraft and strategies (pp. 123 ff.). The CATO
Institute authors are concerned with a doctrine of a very different kind, that
is, the tradition of doubt and skepticism about the U.S. policy in NATO,
specifically, and U.S. engagement in Europe generally. This doctrine reaches
back to the revisionist historical writings of Charles Beard in the 1930s, if not
to the origins of American political thought about the international system.
In Galen Carpenter’s view, the 1999 war has resulted in a “full blown
fiasco” (p. 1), visible in the enduring conflict in the southern reaches of
former Yugoslavia. This debacle arises from grave errors of policy and
strategy outlined by Christopher Layne (pp. 11–20). Especially odious, in his
view, is the wrongful belief of Secretary of State Albright that the 1999 air
campaign would lead swiftly to the same diplomatic outcome as in 1994–95,
when Milosevic yielded to the West. This error derived, in turn, from the
West’s naive and gullible sympathy for the Albanians and the insistence on
turning a blind eye to the terror and thuggery of the Kosovo Liberation Army.
Moreover, in Doug Bandow’s view, this one-sided affection for the Kosovars
made the leading proponents of NATO intervention argue hypocritically that
the events in Kosovo constituted genocide, even though the toll of violence
there was statistically minuscule by comparison to those of the civil wars in
Algeria, Sierra Leone, and Sri Lanka (pp. 31–50). Further, he suggests that
NATO betrays a glaring falseness in its humanitarian rhetoric of “never again”
(referring to the Holocaust) given that it whitewashed Turkey’s expulsion of
some 165,000 Greek Cypriots in 1974 and tolerated Ankara’s subsequent
ethnic warfare against the Kurds. Those upon whom the NATO bombs fell
draw Christopher Layne’s sympathy, in a further chapter (pp. 51–58), wherein
26 Cf. Galen Carpenter, Beyond NATO: Staying Out of Europe’s Wars (Washington, D.C.: CATO, 1994); also
Galen Carpenter, ed., The Future of NATO (London: Frank Cass, 1995).
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he damns the alliance for destroying highway bridges, the electricity network
and killing hundreds of innocent Serb and Kosovar civilians. Indeed, in his
view, NATO’s decision to wage war against the Serbs to aid the Kosovars
turned a “bad situation into a humanitarian crisis” (p. 3). While the foregoing
contains a well known set of arguments heard before the war and thereafter,
the chapter by Gary Dempsey highlights the lesser known damage done by
the war to the whole region’s economy, trade, and investment (pp. 59–76).
This chapter is the most informative of the compendium. Dempsey believes
that this collateral harm has exacerbated the political and social conflicts
among Serbia’s neighbors to the general detriment of the West. Galen Car-
penter also faults NATO for having treated the Russians shabbily and pushed
them into a closer anti-American relationship with China. This shambles of a
strategic outcome scarcely justifies NATO’s rhetoric, much less the scale of its
war effort.
Further chapters underscore still broader deleterious effects of the
“humanitarian war.” The imperial presidency and constitutional problems
inherent in U.S. civil-military relations have only increased. A deleterious
precedent is set for the world’s democracies by the U.S. executive kicking the
traces of checks and balances. The thrashing of a small, defenseless power
has unwittingly undermined the goal of nuclear counter-proliferation. The
pan-Albanians are now on the march and will surely assume the role of chief
mischief-maker in Southeastern Europe, with the result that NATO itself will
have to partition Kosovo in its own version of ethnic cleansing or else remain
its warden for decades. In any event, peace support operations in Southeast-
ern Europe depend far too much on NATO and the United States, even
though they lie well outside the vital interests of the United States. Finally, the
transformation of NATO according to the imperatives of collective security
invites an unstable future featuring one kind of Kosovo-type intervention
after another. Galen Carpenter believes that NATO’s policy and strategy put
in hand in the 1999 “New Strategic Concept”,27 that is, to go beyond the
narrower confines of collective defense as visible in Articles V and VI, reflects
an attempt by the buccaneers of Brussels/Evere to renovate an obsolete
NATO in the highly reckless manner that has erected a drill grounds in
Southeastern Europe for a super-constabulary (p. 173 ff.).
If one seeks a slim volume that contains a panoptic of contrarian
arguments against the 1999 war as well as a catalog of its destructive effects
on policy, the international system, U.S. domestic politics, and Southeastern
Europe itself, then CATO’s editors leave little to be desired. But what they
gain in polemical force is lost through a certain absence of objectivity. After
all, the electoral triumph in October 2000 of pro-Western parties in Belgrade,
however incomplete, has been a signal accomplishment linked to the passage




of arms in 1999. The overthrow of the Milosevic clique and his subsequent
dispatch on June 28, 2001, to the defendant’s stand at the International War
Crimes Tribunal in the Hague appears to have made NATO’s victory some-
what less hollow than it appeared at the close of 1999. Finally, might the
editor of this volume perhaps suffer from a certain kind of hollowness,
himself, when he dismisses the wars in former Yugoslavia as having been
“annoyances” from “small countries on Europe’s periphery” and suggests that
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, and perhaps Macedonia have had no real
meaning to American interests because the fighting since 1991 left the “mac-
ro-stability” of Europe unaffected (pp. 178–19)? But notwithstanding the
volume’s mission to “broaden the parameters” of policy debate (p. 196), its
characterization of the wars of Yugoslav succession as an “annoyance” will
not win approbation from anyone who actually saw the misery firsthand and
detracts from whatever merit the book may have for the parameters of policy.
If one thought that authors from the CATO Institute and the Hoover
Institution would embrace the same points of view, then a comparison of
Galen Carpenter’s volume and NATO: Its Past, Present, and Future by Peter
Duignan, a scholar of international history of Stanford University’s Hoover
Institution, suggests otherwise. Whereas Galen Carpenter sees NATO as
having fiendishly reinvented itself so as to entangle the United States in a new
era of European blood feuds, Duignan praises the success of NATO for
having contributed to a better Europe after 1945 (pp. ix ff.). Duignan writes
in defense of the U.S. engagement in Europe in this little volume prepared for
NATO’s fiftieth anniversary in April 1999. Sadly, that celebration held in
Washington was eclipsed by the smoke of the war. In the first instance,
Duignan offers a highly compact history of the alliance, which, if a novice or
student had only an hour to devote to this topic, offers an excellent point of
departure. Many such readers indeed exist in North America and Europe, and
they always look for a place to start to understand the organization, which for
an outsider is a daunting task. Duignan describes the origins of the alliance,
the rising importance of nuclear weapons, the problems of alliance cohesion
in the Cold War, and the characteristics of national contributions to security
and defense. Moreover, he includes the political and military transition from
confrontation to a reduction of tensions that began in the 1970s, only to be
followed by renewed crisis at the end of the decade, and finally, the trans-
formation of the alliance that ensued at the end of the 1980s.
Duignan’s historical treatment is joined with the remainder of the
book, roughly eighty pages, which devotes itself to NATO policy of the
immediate past, present, and future. Much of this section concerns the wars
in former Yugoslavia and Kosovo, where the author fears that the alliance will
become bogged down in open-ended constabulary missions. He hopes that
some kind of European force would assume this burden, although his
thinking in this connection remains somewhat diffuse, as does the number of
organizations and policies—past and present—which he believes should
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shoulder the task. Thus, it is important to distinguish between the now
essentially defunct Western European Union (WEU), a European Security and
Defense Identity (ESDI) and a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP),
the latter two representing the policy desire of the European Union to act
more cohesively in security and defense, which, by the way, has long been
a goal of U.S. policy, as well since the time of the European Defense
Community in 1950–51. The “headline goal” of ESDP to raise a 60,000-strong
EU rapid reaction force reflects this policy and poses no threat to the
durability of NATO. The author does welcome the 1999 enlargement of the
alliance, but his fears that enlargement may weaken decision making in the
NAC and Military Committee (p. 115) are dubious. Moreover, the author
assumes far too much of the willingness and capacity of Germany, in his
words, to “take over” the banner of leadership in NATO from the United
States (p. 119). No such desire exists today in Germany, which is beset with
the long-term consequences of unification and where the political culture
harbors no nostalgia for the trappings of glory and power that long ago
disappeared. Germans, no less than the Danes or the Dutch, are far more
interested in prosperity, personal security, and “lifestyle” issues than in
strategy and diplomacy—thanks, in large part, to the very success of NATO.
But only a part of the continent enjoys the peace and security that allow for
such self-indulgence. The challenge of the decades is precisely that of getting
Europeans—and Americans—interested in working arduously for pluralistic
institutions that can address the current and future causes of strife and war.
The rise and fall of Milosevic proves that the dangers of integral nationalism
and war have not been eradicated—indeed they take on an even more
sinister aspect when policy intellectuals assert, to paraphrase Harry Lime in
Graham Greene’s Third Man, that democracy is best suited to the production
of cuckoo clocks, or dismiss the broken and emaciated bodies of tens of
thousands of “peripheral” Europeans as an “annoyance.”
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